

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 7 USNATO 0575

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REF: A. USNATO 0063

B. USNATO 460 (NOTAL)

C. STATE 022506 (NOTAL)

IS HAS CIRCULATED DRAFT 1075 MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
(DRC/WP(75)1) WITH COVER NOTE BY ASYG HUMPHREYS. MISSION COMMENT:
MISSION SENT US-PROPOSED TEXT FOR "NATO DEFENSE IN THE LONG TERM"
(REF B AS REVISED BY REF C) TO IS ON JANUARY 31. IS WILL
CIRCULATE US PROPOSAL AS ADDENDUM (PARA 4) TO DRAFT GUIDANCE.
MISSION WILL FURNISH COMMENTS ON IS DRAFT BY SEPTTEL. END COMMENT.
TEXT OF ASYG HUMPHREYS' COVER NOTE FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT OF COVER
NOTE:
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DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975

NOTE BY THE CHAIRMAN

AS AGREED AT OUR INFORMAL MEETINGS EARLIER THIS MONTH, I ATTACH A NEW DRAFT OF THE MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENT. I SUGGEST THAT WE MEET TO DISCUSS IT TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF NEXT MONTH.

THE TEXT HAS BEEN LARGELY PUT TOGETHER FROM EXISTING MATERIAL, AND IS IN PLACES INCOMPLETE. THE INTENTION IS TO ELICIT VIEWS ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT AND ITS GENERAL THRUST. WHEN WE ARE AGREED ON THIS, WE CAN DEAL WITH FINER POINTS OF DRAFTING.

I HOPE THAT AT OUR FEBRUARY MEETING DELEGATIONS WILL BE ABLE TO EXPRESS VIEWS ON THE ABOVE WHICH WILL ENABLE THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF TO PRODUCE A MORE POLISHED VERSION. END TEXT OF COVER NOTE. TEXT OF DRC/WP(75)1 FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975

INTRODUCTION

1. THE AGREED PROCEDURES FOR DEFENCE PLANNING IN NATO (1) CALL FOR MINISTERS TO GIVE GUIDANCE EVERY TWO YEARS ON THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS WHICH COULD AFFECT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO FORCES DURING THE PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION, AND THE IMPACT OF THESE FACTORS ON NATO STRATEGY. WHERE APPROPRIATE IT WILL ALSO IDENTIFY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS, SUGGEST PRIORITIES AND DRAW ATTENTION TO AREAS OF MAJOR CONCERN.

2. THE INITIAL PRUPOSE OF THE GUIDANCE IS TO SHAPE THE FORCE PROPOSALS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS. BUT AS A MAJOR POLICY DOCUMENT, ENDORSED BY MINISTERS, IT ALSO PROVIDES A DIRECTIVE AND REFERENCE POINT FOR ALL DEFENCE PLANNING ACTIVITIES, BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IN NATO.

3. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE HAS ADDRESSED THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE FORCE PROPOSALS, THAT IS THE NEXT SEVEN YEARS. THE REALITIES OF DEFENCE PLANNING IN NATO NOW REQUIRE THAT THE PREPARATION OF FORCE GOALS FOR 1982 SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF LONGER TERM CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES EXTENDING
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BEYOND THIS DATE.

NATO DEFENCE IN THE LONG-TERM

4. (US TO PROPOSE A TEXT)

THE WARSAW PACT

5. THE FUNDAMENTAL COURSES OF TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAVE STILL TO BE RESOLVED. THESE ARE IN LARGE PART IDEOLOGICAL, BUT HAVE DEVELOPED INTO A CONTEST FOR POWER IN WHICH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ISSUES ARE ALSO INVOLVED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SOVIET LEADERS HAVE RENOUNCED THEIR ULTIMATE AIM OF EXTENDING SOVIET COMMUNIST POWER AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES, INCLUDING THOSE OFFERED BY SUBVERSION, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR

POSITION AND THREATENED WESTERN INTERESTS WHENEVER THEY CAN DO SO WITHOUT UNDUE MILITARY RISK. THESE POLICIES WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE USE, DIRECT AND INDIRECT, OF THEIR MILITARY POWER, WHICH CONTINUES TO BE BUILT UP WITHOUT LOSS OF MOMENTUM ON A WORLD-WIDE SCALE.

(1) DPC/D(71)10

6. WITHIN EUROPE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE THE SAME. SHE REMAINS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE WARSAW PACT, TO MAINTAIN HER PREDOMINANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND TO TIGHTEN THE TIES WITH THE OTHER PACT COUNTRIES. HER AIMS INCLUDE WEAKENING THE POLITICAL COHESION OF THE WEST, PROVOKING DIVISIONS BETWEEN ITS MEMBERS, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN THE NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES AND EUROPE, AND WORKING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OR REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM EUROPE. AS REGARDS THE USE OF MILITARY POWER SHE HAS IN RECENT YEARS PURSUED A CAUTIOUS LINE, RECOGNIZING THAT ANY PRI"ES, STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL WHICH SHE MIGHT GAIN THEREBY CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED AT A COST WHICH MAY RENDER THEM VALUELESS. IT IS CLEAR FROM HER ACTIONS, HOWEVER, THAT SHE HAS NOT RENOUNCED THE USE OF FORCE TO ATTAIN HER ENDS WHERE SHE BELIEVES THEY CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT UNDUE RISK.

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7. IN AREAS ADJACENT TO NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, SOVIET POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR MILITARY PENETRATION IS ALREADY EVIDENT AND UNDERMINES WESTERN INTERESTS AND SECURITY. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFTICA ON WHOSE OIL RESOURCES THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY THE NATO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT. SOVIET INDIRECT INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND THE ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE CYPRUS CONFLICT TO THE DETRIMENT OF NATO ARE ONLY THE MOST RECENT ILLUSTRATIONS OF HER STRATEGIC INTEREST IN THIS THEATRE. SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, LENDS POWER AND CONVICTION TO SUPPORT HER POLICIES IN THESE AREAS. FURTHER FORCES STRENGTHENS SOVIET EFFORTS TO LIMIT OR REPLACE WESTERN INFLUENCE WHEREVER POSSIBLE, AND TO SUPPORT REGIMES SYMPATHETIC TO THE SOVIET UNION.

THE THREAT
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8. THE WARSAW PACT ALREADY POSSESSES A MILITARY CAPABILITY MUCH GREATER THAN THAT NEEDED FOR SELF-DEFENCE. IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FIELD THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY ATTAINED ROUGH PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMBINATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY WITH SUPERIOR THROW-WEIGHT MAY IN FUTURE GIVE THEM A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE. IMPROVMENTS ARE BEING MADE IN THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL LAND AND AIR FORCES; THE INCREASE IN THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THESE FORCES, REPRESENTED BY NEW TANKS, ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. AT SEA THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET MARITIME FORCES AND THEIR WORLD-WIDE DEPLOYMENT HAVE MARKEDLY INCREASED THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF THE THREAT. THIS IS AN INDICATION OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO USE MILITARY POWER IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL AIMS ON A GLOBAL SCALE. IT ALSO GIVES THEM THE ABILITY TO DEPLOY MILITARY POWER AGAINST THE WEST IN SITUATIONS INDEPENDENT OF A LAND/AIR ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE.

NATO STRATEGY

9. THE AIM OF NATO'S STRATEGY AND MILITARY PLANNING IS TO ENSURE SECURITY THROUGH DETERRENCE. THE PRIMARY AIM IS TO DETER AN ATTACK BEFORE IT IS LAUNCHED, BY MAKING IT CLEAR TO ANY AGGRESSOR THAT ANY ATTACK ON NATO WOULD INITIATE A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH CANNOT BE CALCULATED IN ADVANCE, AND WHICH INVOLVES RISKS TO THE AGGRESSOR OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO ANY ADVANTAGES HE MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN. IN AN ERA OF BROAD STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY DETERRENCE TO ALL FORMS OF AGGRESSION CANNOT BE CREDIBLY BASED UPON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ALONE; IT MUST, THEREFORE, BE PROVIDED BY THE OVERALL CAPABILITIES OF NATO FORCES. THE ALLIANCE HOWEVER DOES NOT NEED OR INTEND TO MATCH WARSAW PACT FORCE CAPABILITIES IN EVERY RESPECT, BUT MUST BE ABLE TO RESPOND IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER TO AGGRESSION OF ANY KIND. THE RESPONSE MUST BE EFFECTIVE IN RELATION TO THE LEVEL OF FORCE USED BY THE AGGRESSOR AND MUST ALSO CARRY WITH IT THE THREAT OF ESCALATION TO A HIGHER LEVEL.

10. SHOULD AGGRESSION OCCUR, THE MILITARY AIR IS TO PRESERVE OR RESTORE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATO AREA BY EMPLOYING SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENCE. NATO FORCES MUST BE PREPARED TO USE ANY CAPABILITIES AT THEIR DISPOSAL (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE MEANS USED MAY BE DIRECT DEFENCE; OR DELIBERATE ESCALATION TO BRING HOME TO THE OTHER SIDE WITH UNMISTAKABLE FORCE THE
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RISKS OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION; OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH; OR A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

STRATEGIC BALANCE

11. SOVIET POLICIES AND CALCULATIONS AS TO THE RISKS AND GAINS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO WILL CONTINUE TO BE INFLUENCED BY PRECEPTION OF NATO'S ABILITY AND WILL TO RESIST AND RETALIATE; THAT IS BY THE ASSESSMENT OF OUR ABILITY TO RESIST AGGRESSION AND OF OUR DETERMINATION TO CARRY ON THE CONFLICT BY BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND IF NECESSARY, NUCLEAR MEANS. THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF NATO COUNTRIES IN ALL AREAS OF THE WORLD AND THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE ARE COMPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE. PROVIDED THIS COMBINATION CONTINUES TO CONVINCE THE WARSAW PACT THAT NO EASY GAINS ARE POSSIBLE AND THAT A THREAT TO NATO TERRITORY, FORCES, OR VITAL INTERSETS, ON WHATEVER SCALE, CARRIES WITH IT AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WAR, NO DELIBERATE ATTACK IS LIKELY.

12. THE MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD EXPLOIT THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY IS CLOSELY RELATED TO NATO'S WILL AND CAPABILITY TO REACT AND TO THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THIS. SHOULD APPARENT WEAKNESSES IN OUR POLITICAL RESOLVE OR INADEQUACIES IN THE SCALE OF EFFORT WE DEVOTE TO OUR OWN DEFENCE CAUSE THE WARSAW PACT TO SOUBT THE ULTIMATE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, OUR GENERAL CAPABILITY TO RESIST AGGRESSION OR OUR DETERMINATION TO DEFEND OURSELVES BY ALL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL, THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO USE THE MILITARY POWER AVAILABLE TO THEM IN A DELIBERATE ATTACK ON NATO.

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13. THERE COULD BE DIFFERENCES FROM REGION TO REGION IN THE WAY THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ASSESS THE RISKS AND ADVANTAGES OF SUCH AN ATTACK AND IN THE SCALE OF ATTACK TO BE ADOPTED; IT COULD VARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH GEOGRAPHY AND THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES. THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT JUDGE, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THE MILITARY WEAKNESSES OF THE FLANKS WOULD MAKE THEM PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO A DELIBERATE ATTACK ON A LIMITED SCALE. AN ATTACK ON A LIMITED SCALE SEEMS LESS LIKELY HOWEVER IN THE CENTRAL REGION OF ACE WHERE THERE IS A MAJOR CONCENTRATION OF NATO COMBAT FORCES. AS FOR NATO EUROPE AS A WHOLE, THE WARSAW PACT MUST REALISE THAT A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK WOULD CARRY WITH IT AN EXTREMELY HIGH RISK OF INVOLVING VERY SUBSTANTIAL NATO FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. THE POSSIBILITY OF GENERAL NUCLEAR ATTACK REMAINS BUT IT IS UNLIKELY SO LONG AS THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE RETAIN A CREDIBLE SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY. IT MUST ALSO BE RECOGNIZED
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THAT THE GROWTH OF THE SOVIET MARITIME CAPABILITIES NOW GIVES THEM THE ABILITY TO ATTACK NATO FORCES AND TO INTERFERE WITH NATO SUPPLY ROUTES INDEPENDENTLY OF A LAND/AIR ATTACK ON NATO TERRITORY.

PURPOSE OF NATO FORCES

14. IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGY OF THIS THE
RESPONSE NATO NEEDS:

(A) STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, MANIFESTLY CAPABLE OF
INFLECTING UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE SOVIET UNION
EVEN AFTER SURPRISE NUCLEAR ATTACK;

(B) CONVENTIONAL LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES CAPABLE OF
OFFERING A SUBSTANTIAL RESISTANCE IN THE FORWARD
AREAS TO WARSAW PACT AGGRESSION ON ANY PROBABLE SCALE;

(C) A CAPABILITY FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES: THIS CAPABILITY SHOULD BE OF SUCH A SIZE AND CHARACTER AND SO DEPLOYED AND ORGANIZED AS TO:

(I) CONVINCE THE AGGRESSOR THAT ANY ATTACK ON NATO, WHETHER CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR, COULD RESULT IN SERIOUS DAMAGE TO HIS FORCES;

(II) PRESENT HIM WITH THE RISK THAT SUCH A SITUATION COULD ESCALATE UNCONTROLLABLY IN THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION, WHILE RETAINING CONTROL OF THIS PROCESS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN NATO HANDS.

15. THESE ELEMENTS OF NATO FORCES SHOULD POSSESS AN INDEPENDENT CREDIBILITY AND SHOULD COMBINE TO PRODUCE AN INTER-LOCKING SYSTEM OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE. THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH TO RESIST AND REPEL A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ON A LIMITED SCALE, AND TO DETER LARGER SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS THROUGH THE PROSPECT OF AN EXPANSION OF THE AREA, SCALE AND INTENSITY OF HOSTILITIES WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NEVERTHELESS SHOULD LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION OCCUR, NATO FORCES SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A DEFENCE IN THE FORWARD AREAS SUFFICIENT TO INFLICT SERIOUS LOSSES ON THE AGGRESSOR AND CONVINCE HIM OF THE RISKS OF ESCALATION; THE AIM IS TO CONSTRAIN THE AGGRESSOR TO WITHDRAW AND TO GIVE NATO TIME FOR CONSULTATION AND THE TAKING OF NUCLEAR DECISIONS. THE PURPOSE OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS TO ENHANCE THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES AGAINST LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK OR AGAINST THE EXPANSION OF LIMITED ATTACKS, AND TO EMPHASISE THE DANGERS OF A CONTINUANCE OF A CONFLICT ONCE BEGUN BY POSING THE RISKS OF UNCONTROLLABLE ESCALATION TO ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR. IT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES TO PROVIDE THIS ULTIMATE SANCTION FOR THE OVERALL STRATEGY.

16. THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS DISCUSS SOME OF THE FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE CHARACTERISTICS REQUIRED OF NATO FORCES (AND THEIR SUPPORT) IN DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE.

WARNING OF WAR

17. WARNING OF WAR IS A CONTINUING PROCESS OF ASSESSING FROM AVAILABLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY INDICATORS THE LIKELIHOOD OF A WARSAW PACT DECISION TO ATTACK AND OF THEIR PREPAREDNESS TO DO SO. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES WILL BE ABLE TO DETERMINE POSITIVELY THAT A DECISION TO ATTACK HAS BEEN TAKEN OR WHEN SUCH AN ATTACK WILL TAKE PLACE. DECISIONS ABOUT INCREASING NATO'S PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO BE TAKEN ON INCOMPLETE EVIDENCE, WHEN THE VARIOUS INDICATORS AVAILABLE CONTINUE TO JUSTIFY THE TAKING

OF A CERTAIN LEVEL OF COUNTERMEASURES. THIS PROCESS CAN ONLY BE A MATTER OF JUDGEMENT FOR THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES AT THE TIME; IT CANNOT BE FORECAST BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING TWO PRINCIPLES MUST BE EMPHASISED:

(A) ALL AUTHORITIES, BOTH NATO AND NATIONAL, CONCERNED WITH DECISION-MAKING IN TIME OF CRISIS, MUST RECOGNISE THE ADVANTAGE WHICH THE AGGRESSOR GAINS FROM THE INITIATIVE; THIS ADVANTAGE WILL BE INCREASED IF NATO DECISIONS ARE DELAYED UNTIL UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE OF IMPENDING ATTACK IS PROVIDED. THE EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF NATO'S DEFENCE WILL DEPEND UPON EARLY AND RESOLUTE USE OF SUCH CONFIDENTIAL

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WARNING AS MAY BE AVAILABLE;

(B) SOME BROAD BUT REALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE TIME WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR NATO COUNTRIES TO PUT THEIR FORCES AND ECONOMIES ON A FULL WAR FOOTING (I.E. "USABLE WARNING TIME" OR "PREPARATION TIME") ARE ESSENTIAL FOR RATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING.

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18. THE EXTENT OF THE WARNING WHICH NATO MIGHT EXPECT TO RECEIVE IN VARIOUS CASES IS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN THE CURRENT VERSION OF MC161. THIS STATES THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SURPRISE ATTACK WITH NUCLEAR MISSILES IS CONSIDERED AS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. AS FOR OTHER FORMS OF ATTACK, IT IS BELIEVED THAT SOVIET CALCULATIONS WOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE DESIRE TO ACHIEVE THE OPTIMUM COMPROMISE BETWEEN ACHIEVING SURPRISE AND ENSURING FOR THEMSELVES THE FULL ADVANTAGES OF MOBILIZATION AND PREPARATION. IN THE FIRST CASE THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT FOREGO THE FULL ADVANTAGES OF PREPRRATION IN FAVOUR OF SURPRISE. IN THIS CASE STRONG INDICATORS PROVIDING ABOUT 48 HOURS OF WARNING MIGHT BE EXPECTED. IN THE SECOND THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT PREFER TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF ITS MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY AND TO ATTACK AFTER 21 DAYS OF PREPARATION. NOT ALL OF THIS PERIOD WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO NATO AS WARNING TIME, PARTICULARLY IF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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WARSAW PACT DECIDED TO POSTPONE MAJOR FORWARD MOVEMENT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

19. IT MAY BE CONCLUDED FROM THE ABOVE THAT A REASONABLE ASSUMPTION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS THAT IN CASE OF A MAJOR ATTACK, NATO MIGHT EXPECT TO RECEIVE BETWEEN 3 AND 14 DAYS OF WARNING. IN CALCULATING THE USABLE TIME AVAILABLE TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES, HOWEVER, TIME HAS TO BE ALLOWED WITHIN THIS PERIOD FOR THE EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS BY THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES, AND FOR CONSULTATION AND DECISION-MAKING.

20. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASISED THAT IN PLANNING THEIR ATTACK AND IN DECIDING ON THE METHOD OF ITS EXECUTION THE SOVIETS WOULD TAKE INTO THEIR CALCULATIONS THEIR PERCEPTION OF NATO'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND AND SURVIVE AN ATTACK WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING, COMPARED WITH ITS MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY.

NATURE OF ATTACK AND DEFENCE

21. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE PRECISELY THE CHARACTER OF A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK BY WARSAW PACT FORCES ON WESTERN EUROPE. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE SOME BROAD ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE TACTICS WHICH MIGHT BE ADOPTED BY HE WARSAW PACT IN MOUNTING SUCH AN ATTACK, IN ORDER TO PLAN AN EFFECTIVE DEFENCE AND MAXIMISE THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF NATO FORCES AGAINST IT.

22. THE MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THE COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THEIR LAND AND AIR FORCES SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THEIR CONCEPT OF ATTACK ENVISAGES HIGHLY MOBILE CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES, BACKED WITH GREAT FIRE-POWER. THE STAYING POWER OF INDIVIDUAL FORMATIONS MIGHT BE LIMITED, BUT THE

MOMENTUM OF THE ASSAULT WOULD BE MAINTAINED BY SUCCESSIVE REPLACEMENT FROM SUBSTANTIAL FOLLOW-UP FORCES. THEIR AIM WOULD BE TO FORCE A QUICK BREAKTHROUGH OF NATO DEFENCES IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT DECISIVE MILITARY RESULTS BEFORE THE MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE MOBILIZED TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION.

23. NATO'S AIMS, THEREFORE, ARE TO SURVIVE AND WITHSTAND THE
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INITIAL SHOCK OF ATTACK, AND THEREAFTER TO CONDUCT AN EFFECTIVE DEFENCE IN THE FORWARD AREAS FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, IN ORDER TO DENY THE WARSAW PACT THE OPPORTUNITY OF ESTABLISHING A FAIT ACCOMPLI, TO PROTECT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THE SECURITY OF NATO TERRITORY AND POPULATIONS, AND TO GIVE TIME FOR CONSULTATION ON A COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE RESPONSE, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NATO FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING A COHERENT CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE UP TO AND AFTER THE POINT AT WHICH A DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS BEEN TAKEN.

24. IN SOME AREAS OF THE FLANKS THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE PROLONGED HOSTILITIES ON A LIMITED SCALE AND AT A LOWER LEVEL OF INTENSITY. /ON THE OTHER HAND, IN VIEW OF THE FORCE CAPABILITIES AS WELL AS THE NATURE OF OBJECTIVES OF THE WARSAW PACT THIS POSSIBILITY SEEMS TO BE UNLIKELY FOR THE SOUTH EASTERN FLANK./

25. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY CHOOSE TO USE HER GROWING MARITIME CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO FORCES AT SEA, OR IN ORDER TO INTERFERE WITH THE ECONOMIES AND VITAL SUPPLIES OF NATO NATIONS, INDEPENDENTLY OF A LAND/AIR ATTACK ON THE TERRITORY OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE PROCESS OF ESCALATION ARISING FROM SUCH A SITUATION IS NOT COMPARABLE WITH, NOR SO AUTOMATIC AS THAT WHICH COULD RESULT FROM AN ATTACK ON NATO TERRITORY. NATO MUST BE PREPARED TO DETER AND DEFEND TSELF AGAINST SUCH AGGRESSION BY ...

26. FINALLY THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT CONFLICTS IN AREAS BORDERING UPON, BUT NOT WITHIN, THE NATO AREA COULD BE EXTENDED IN WAYS WHICH AFFECT THE SECURITY OF NATO NATIONS. THE CHARACTER OF SUCH CONFLICTS WOULD INITIALLY BE SIMILAR TO THOSE EXPECTED ON THE FLANKS OF NATO (PARAGRAPH 24 ABOVE), BUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF ESCALATION IN BOTH THE INTENSITY AND AREA OF THE CONFLICT SHOULD ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND.

27. THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF NATO'S CAPABILITIES IN THESE AREAS ARE BOUND TO INFLUENCE THEIR CALCULATIONS AS TO THE LIKELY SUCCESS OF THEIR ATTACK AND THEIR DECISIONS ON TACTICS AND TIMING.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES

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28. THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE ABILITY OF NATO FORCES TO DETER AND DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST THE KINDS OF AGGRESSION DESCRIBED ABOVE MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE SIZE AND READINESS OF STANDING FORCES;

(B) THE ABILITY OF STANDING FORCES AND WEAPON SYSTEMS TO SURVIVE AND WITHSTAND INITIAL ASSAULT;

(C) THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY OF REINFORCEMENT AND MOBILIZATION FORCES, AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH THEY CAN BE PUT TO BEAR;

(D) THE DEPTH OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT AVAILABLE;

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(E) FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY OF FORCES.

29. THE PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTICS REQUIRED IN EACH TYPE OF FORCE ARE DISCUSSED FURTHER BELOW.

- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ...

- THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES ...

- LAND FORCES ...

- SEA FORCES ...

- AIR FORCES ...

- RESERVE AND MOBILIZATION FORCES ...

- LOGISTIC SUPPORT ...

MBFR

30. WHILE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, FORCE PLANNING IN THE NATO SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT BEFORE 1982 NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN EUROPE MAY BE REDUCED TO A COMMON CEILING OF 700,000 MEN, AND THAT THESE REDUCTIONS MIGHT BEGIN WITH WITHDRAWALS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET TROOPS RESPECTIVELY. ACCOUNT SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE MIGHT BE A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO ACE.

31. THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH REDUCTIONS FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS, STRUCTURE, DEPLOYMENT AND EQUIPMENT OF NATO FORCES SHOULD NOW BE STUDIED.

RESOURCES

32. LEAVING ASIDE THE POSSIBILITIES OF MBFR, WHICH CANNOT BE PREDICTED, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT DURING THE CURRENT PLANNING PERIOD NATO'S PRESENT FORCE CAPABILITIES WILL HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED AT LEAST AT THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. THIS IMPLIES THE REGULAR REPLACEMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT. THIS MUST BE THE BASIC ASSUMPTION WHICH DETERMINES THE ANNUAL AND LONG-TERM ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES IN ALL COUNTRIES.

33. IN RECENT YEARS THE MAIN PROBLEM OF DEFENCE RESOURCE
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PLANNING HAS BEEN THE PHENOMENON THAT OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES (MOSTLY DUE TO DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO PERSONNEL COST) HAVE RISEN SHARPLY, AND THAT INCREASES IN DEFENCE BUDGETS HAVE NOT KEPT PACE WITH THE RATES OF INCREASE OF O&M COST. THIS HAS LED TO THE GENERAL EXPERIENCE THAT THE SHARES AVAILABLE FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT HAVE BEEN PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED, EVENTUALLY TO A POINT WHERE NEEDED REPLACEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMMES COULD NOT BE CARRIED THROUGH AS REQUIRED. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRESENT FORCE CAPABILITIES IN THE FUTURE ALLOWING FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION, IT MUST BE ENSURED THAT THE DEFENCE BUDGETS INCREASE AT A RATE COMMENSURATE WITH THE RATE OF INCREASE IN OPERATING, I.E. PERSONNEL COST. IF THIS IS DONE, THE ANNUAL FLUCTUATIONS OF INFLATION WOULD BECOME OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE IN DEFENCE PLANNING: HIGHER RATES OF INFLATION IMPLYING

HIGHER INCREASES IN DEFENCE BUDGETS, LOWER INFLATION RATES
MEANING LOWER INCREASES IN DEFENCE BUDGETS. ONLY A GOVERNMENT
POLICY OF THIS NATURE CAN EFFECTIVELY SAFEGUARD THE AVAILABILITY
OF SUFFICIENT RESOURCES FOR REQUIRED EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION
PROGRAMMES.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEFENCE BURDEN

34. THERE IS NO SIMPLE FORMULA APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTRIES
THAT CAN ADEQUATELY REFLECT THEIR DEFENCE EFFORTS. HOWEVER, A
NUMBER OF CRITERIA HAVE FOUND A LARGE DEGREE OF ACCEPTANCE IN
GIVING INDICATIONS OF THE RELATIVE ECONOMIC EFFORTS MADE FOR
DEFENCE. THE DEFENCE SHARE OF GNP IS ONE OF THE MOST COMMONLY
USED MEASURES, BUT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN COUNTRIES SUCH AS STAGE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(E.G. AS REFLECTED IN GNP PER HEAD), RELATIVE GROWTH RATES
OR GEO-CLIMATIC CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, THE DEFENCE SHARE OF
GNP TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH GNP AND DEFENCE PER HEAD CAN
PROVIDE A USEFUL FIRST APPROXIMATION OF AN EVALUATION OF
RELATIVE DEFENCE BURDENS. THESE CRITERIA CAN BE USED IN
COMBINATION WITH OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS IN NATO DEFENCE
PLANNING.

MUTUAL AID

35. CERTAIN MEMBER COUNTRIES, NOTABLY THOSE STILL IN
PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND WITH LOW NATIONAL INCOMES,
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PRESENT A SPECIAL PROBLEM AS CONCERNS THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE
RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE. THEY ARE, TO A GREAT EXTENT, DEPENDENT
ON AID FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR MEETING FORCE
GOALS AND FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT. WHILE, THEREFORE,
THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING FURTHER PROVISION FOR ASSISTANCE
SHOULD BE FULLY EXPLORED, THE DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMIC
SITUATION MIGHT WELL REQUIRE THAT CONSIDERATION ALSO BE GIVEN
TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF CO-OPERATIVE ACTION AND ASSISTANCE
IN THE FIELD OF TRADE AND PAYMENTS THAT WOULD UNDER-PIN THEIR
EFFORTS.

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TECHNOLOGY

36. NATO COLLECTIVELY NEEDS TO MAINTAIN A TECHNOLOGICAL BASE SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT NECESSARY FORCE IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE MADE WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING OVERALL MILITARY BALANCES, ENSURE THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO FORCES, AND MINIMIZE THE CHANGES OF TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISES. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AN EFFICIENT AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL BASE, NATO SHOULD SEEK A MORE RATIONAL CO-ORDINATED DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TASKS, WHICH PERMITS ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION AND WASTE, PROMOTES STANDARDIZATION, AND FACILITATES VIGOROUS FOLLOW-UP IN AREAS IN WHICH THE MILITARY PAY-OFF APPEARS SIGNIFICANT. THIS WILL REQUIRE INCREASED NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

37. NATO FORCES NEED TO BE SUITABLY MODERNIZED TO MEET DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THREAT, BUT NOT ALL FORCES NEED THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SAME OR THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TASKS SHOULD BE ASSESSED AGAINST MISSION REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED PROGRAMME IN WHICH PRIORITIES ARE SET. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN IN THE NEAR TERM TO DEVELOPING LESS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF LOWER UNIT AND LIFE CYCLE COST, HIGH RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY, AND REQUIRING MINIMUM OPERATING PERSONNEL, WHICH CAN EVENTUALLY BE ACQUIRED IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO MAINTAIN OR IMPROVE OVERALL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST REALISTICALLY ASSESSED THREATS.

COMMON PLANS AND PROGRAMMES

38. IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE BEST DETERRENT AND DEFENSIVE VALUE FROM THE RESOURCES LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE, MORE EMPHASIS NEEDS TO BE PLACED ON THE ORGANIZATION OF NATO DEFENCE ON AN INTEGRATED AND CO-OPERATIVE BASIS. EXAMPLES OF THIS ARE:

(A) RATIONALIZATION. RATIONALIZATION INVOLVES CONSOLIDATING REDUNDANT PROGRAMMES, REORGANIZING SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ADJUSTING MISSIONS AND FORCE MIXED OF NATIONAL COMPONENTS. SAVINGS THUS PRODUCED SHOULD THEN BE REINVESTED IN HIGH PRIORITY FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, MODERNIZATION PROGRAMMES, AND COMMON-FUNDED PROGRAMMES. THIS REALLOCATION CANNOT BE DONE COMPLETELY

WITHIN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, BUT ACROSS A LARGE NUMBER OF PROGRAMMES. ELEMENTS IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHOSE FORCES INTERACT IN A GIVEN AREA. RATIONALIZATION OF THIS SORT WILL RESULT IN GREATER MUTUAL SUPPORT AND SPECIALIZATION OF COUNTRIES ON BOTH COMBAT AND LOGISTIC TASKS AS APPROPRIATE. THOSE PROPOSALS WHICH HOLD THE MOST POTENTIAL FOR EARLY PROGRESS INCLUDE CONSOLIDATION OF COMMUNICATIONS, HOST NATION SUPPORT OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC'S) AND COMMON TRAINING.

(B) STANDARDIZATION. HARDWARE STANDARDIZATION, INTEROPERABILITY, AND A DIVISION OF TASKS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED ANEW IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE COSTS OF ACQUIRING NEW EQUIPMENT. A LIMITED NUMBER OF AREAS SHOULD BE SELECTED AS THE INITIAL FOCUS FOR DECISIONS. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THOSE EQUIPMENTS WHICH ARE INHERENTLY MOBILE, SUCH AS AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS, BUT WHICH ARE RESTRICTED IN MOBILITY DUE TO INCOMPATIBILITY AMONG SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND LACK OF COMMONALITY OF CONFIDENTIAL

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MUNITIONS.

(C) FLEXIBILITY. NATO MUST MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF ITS AVAILABLE FORCES. MEMBER COUNTRIES SHOULD DEVELOP PLANS WHICH WILL ALLOW THEM TO DEPLOY NATO'S FORCES TO THE AREA OF GREATEST NEED WITH SPEED, FLEXIBILITY, AND SELECTIVITY AND TO ELIMINATE DELAYS CAUSED BY DIFFERENT SUPPORTING SYSTEMS OR DOCTRINES. FOR THIS PURPOSE, COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, LOGISTICS, TACTICAL MOBILITY AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SHOULD BE REVIEWED. MAJOR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS ELIMINATING CONSTRAINTS TO INCREASED FLEXIBILITY, WHETHER POLITICAL, DOCTRINAL, TECHNICAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL. PRIMARY ATTENTION OF NATO SHOULD INITIALLY BE PAID TO THE CENTRAL REGION AND TO MARITIME FLEXIBILITY, WITH THE NATIONS OF THESE REGIONS TO BE ESPECIALLY INVOLVED, BOTH AT NATO LEVEL AND IN THE VARIOUS REGIONAL COMMANDS AND ORGANIZATIONS. OTHER REGIONAL REVIEWS ARE APPROPRIATE IN DUE COURSE. LOGISTICS PLANNING AND CO-OPERATION SHOULD BE STRESSED AND COMMON USER LOGISTICS SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED.

(D) COMMUNICATIONS.

COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED WHERE PRACTICAL. ON-GOING NATO AND NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAMMES SHOULD SUPPORT THE FLEXIBLE USE OF FORCES, AND NATIONALLY FUNDED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SHOULD BE INTEROPERABLE. STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR THE RECEPTION AND FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS. MEASURES PERTINENT TO MORE FLEXIBLE UTILIZATION OF FORCES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED

WITHIN EXISTING RESOURCES CONSTRAINTS, BUT SHOULD RECEIVE HIGH
PRIORITY IN PLANNING.

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(E) INFRASTRUCTURE. A "RATIONALIZED" AND FLEXIBLE DEFENCE
POSTURE ALSO DEMANDS A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL
FORCES AND THE COMMONLY-FUNDED PROGRAMMES-NOTABLY
INFRASTRUCTURE-WHICH SUPPORT THESE FORCES,
E.G. BETWEEN SHELTERS AND THE AIRCRAFT THEY ARE BUILT
TO PROTECT. A MAJOR PORTION OF ANY ADDITIONAL FUNDS
THAT BECOME AVAILABLE, EITHER BECAUSE OF ECONOMIES
THROUGH RATIONALIZATION, SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO EXPANDING
COMMON PROGRAMMES, OF THIS NATURE.

SUPPORT FROM THE CIVIL SECTOR

39. THE DETERRENT AND DEFENCE POLICIES OF THE ALLIANCE
DEPEND NOT ONLY ON A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO RESIST AGGRESSION
BUT EQUALLY ON THE EVIDENT READINESS OF EACH MEMBER COUNTRY TO
ENGAGE ITS POPULATION AND ITS WHOLE CIVIL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT
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OF THOSE POLICIES. THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE

CONSISTENTLY REPORTED ADVERSELY ON THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE CURRENT LEVELS OF CIVIL AND MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. THERE IS THUS AN URGENT NEED, BOTH NATIONALLY AND AT NATO LEVEL, TO ACHIEVE A CREDIBLE PEACETIME LEVEL OF CIVIL READINESS WHICH WILL TAKE REALISTICALLY INTO ACCOUNT THE LIMITED WARNING TIME LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE IN AN EMERGENCY. MOREOVER, IN THE LIGHT OF THE INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY FORCES, THE CIVIL SECTOR MUST BE FURTHER EXPLOITED TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING SERVICES AND RESOURCES SO AS TO PRESERVE COMBAT STRENGTHS.

40. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES DESCRIBED ABOVE CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING SHOULD BE ORGANIZED ON A NATO BASIS WITH THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE OF ENSUREING THAT THE CIVIL SECTOR CAN MOVE RAPIDLY INTO ACTION, WHEN REQUIRED, TO PROVIDE A SOLID AND DETERMINED HOME FRONT WHICH WOULD:

(A) TRANSLATE THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL ECONOMIES TO A WAR FOOTING;

(B) SUSTAIN THE WILL AND ABILITY OF THE PEOPLE TO MEET AND SURVIVE THE THREAT; AND

(C) PROVIDE IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY.

41. THIS DOES NOT REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT EXPENDITURE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A CONCENTRATED PLANNING EFFORT AND CO-ORDINATION ON A NATO AND NATIONAL BASIS. THE MAXIMUM USE SHOULD BE MADE OF EXISTING CIVIL ASSETS AND FACILITIES AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, DEFENCE NEEDS SHOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN DEVELOPING NEW PLANS FOR PEACETIME PURPOSES. THE WORK SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED MORE DIRECTLY AND SPECIFICALLY WITH PLANNING IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

PRIORITIES

42. IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE BEST MILITARY VALUE FROM THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE WITHOUT A REALLY VIGOROUS INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PRIORITIES.

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43. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A ROUGH PARITY OF FORCES AT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL; THESE NEED TO BE MODERNIZED BUT NOT EXPANDED. AT THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR LEVEL, ALSO, SOME MODERNIZATION IS DESIRABLE; SOME REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS MAY, IN CONSEQUENCE, PROVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE. IT IS IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD THAT THERE IS MOST DANGER OF THE WARSAW PACT GAINING AN ADVANTAGE OVER THE FORCES OF NATO: THIS IS, THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF OVERALL DETERRENT ("THE TRIAD") WHICH MOST NEEDS STRENGTHENING.

44. AT LEAST FOR THE PERIOD UP TO 1982, AVAILABLE
RESOURCES SHOULD BE CHANNELLED IN SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL
FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO:

(A) CAPABILITIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO DETERRENCE;

(B) CAPABILITIES WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED EFFECTIVELY WITHIN
THE WARNING TIME AVAILABLE OR WHICH CAN AFFECT THE
FIRST FEW DAYS OF HOSTILITIES;

(C) MEASURES WHICH IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND READINESS OF
THESE FORCES, AND PROLONG THEIR CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN
A SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE.

THESE SHOULD BE PURSUED IF NECESSARY AT THE EXPENSE OF MEASURES
WHICH DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ABOVE.

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

45. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, MINISTERS HAVE LAID DOWN THE
PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES FOR NATO DEFENCE PLANNING FOR THE
PERIOD UP TO 1982 AND BEYOND, IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. TO
BE COMPLETED LATER.

END TEXT.

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